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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs claims, filed 26 years
after her claimed loss, are barred by applicable statutes of limitation.
This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838
P.2d 1125,1128 (Utah 1992). This issue was raised and decided in defendants' favor in the
district court. (R. 137, 211, 370.)
2. Whether the summary judgment may be affirmed on the alternative grounds of laches
or failure to state a claim for recovery of damages for emotional distress.
This is a question of law for the appellate court. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444
(Utah 1995) (appellate court may affirm on any proper ground, even though different from that
relied upon by the district court). These alternative grounds for summary judgment were
presented to the district court. (R. 223-31.)
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to file a
second amended complaint when no new facts or claims were alleged.
Permission to file an amended pleading is discretionary with the district court, and the
court's ruling denying an amendment is reviewed not for correctness, as plaintiff asserts, but for
abuse of discretion. Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah App. 1993).
This issue was raised and decided in defendants' favor in the district court. (R. 140-97, 244.)

4. On the cross-appeal, whether the district court improperly refused to strike the Carling
Affidavit, obtained through inappropriate ex parte contact of plaintiff s counsel with defendant
Carling.
This issue, involving interpretation of the rules of professional conduct, is reviewed for
correctness as a matter of law. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). This
issue was raised and decided in the district court. (R. 313-18, 370.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The statutes of limitation that govern disposition of this appeal are U.C.A. §§ 78-12-25(3)
(torts) and 78-12-23(2) (written contract), set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10-11.)
The cross-appeal, pertaining to plaintiffs counsel's ex parte acquisition of an affidavit from
defendant Carling, is governed by Rule 4.2, Utah R. Prof. Conduct, set forth verbatim in the
Addendum. (Add. 12-13.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for emotional distress damages arising out of plaintiff s relinquishment
of a newborn child for adoption in 1967, now 30 years ago. Plaintiffs amended complaint
alleges various tort and contract theories all based on the common claim that plaintiff was
incapacitated by medication at the time she signed the adoption consent. (R. 113.) Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by statutes of
limitation, having accrued in 1967, when plaintiff realized that she had relinquished her child for
adoption against her will. (R. 199,211-16.) Defendants also demonstrated that plaintiff s claims
are barred by laches, and that plaintiff is entitled to no relief in any event because damages for
emotional distress are not recoverable. (R. 223-31.) The district court granted summary
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judgment on the basis that plaintiffs claims are barred by statutes of limitation. (R. 369.)
Plaintiff filed this appeal on the limitations ruling (R. 374), and defendants cross-appeal the
denial of relief for plaintiffs counsel's ex parte contact with defendant Carling (R. 381).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the facts set forth in plaintiffs statement of facts to this Court pertain to the
underlying merits of her claims, which the district court did not reach, and are therefore
immaterial to the legal issues presented on this appeal. Following are the undisputed facts
material to this appeal.
In 1967, plaintiff was a 23-year-old unmarried college graduate student. (Amended
Complaint, If 9, R. 114.) By plaintiffs own account, she was "well educated and articulate."
(App. Br. 45.) When she became pregnant, she contacted the predecessor of LDS Social
Services ("Agency") to discuss placing the expected child for adoption. Plaintiff met several
times with Agency social worker Gladys Carling to discuss and plan the adoption prior to the
birth. When the time for delivery arrived, plaintiff was admitted to the hospital under an alias,
and the Agency was designated to pay her medical expenses, all with the understanding that
plaintiff would carry out her plan to relinquish the child for adoption. (Amended Complaint, |
11, R. 114; Defendants9 Affidavit of Gladys S. Carling, f 9, R. 326, hereafter "Second Carling
Afft.")
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On January 145 1967, plaintiff gave birth to a son at St. Benedict's Hospital ("Hospital")
in Ogden, Utah. Following the delivery, the Hospital administered plaintiff a sedative called
Thorazine, as directed by her physician. (Amended Complaint, ffi[ 17-18, R. 115.)1
On January 16, 1967, two days following the birth, Carling went to the Hospital for the
purpose of obtaining plaintiffs release for the adoption. Plaintiff signed a written "Release,"
relinquishing her child to the Agency and consenting to the child's adoption. By signing the
Release, plaintiff affirmed that she had "carefully read" the document, understood its contents,
and was signing freely and voluntarily. Plaintiff also had the presence of mind to add her own
handwritten addendum that if the adoptive parents were unable to perform their responsibilities,
the child should be returned to her. Carling believed that plaintiff had the mental capacity to
understand what she was doing, and that plaintiff did knowingly and voluntarily sign the
Release. The Agency thereafter placed the child for adoption. (Amended Complaint, Tffi 20-21,
R. 115-16; Release, R. 124-26, Add. 7; Def. Carling Aff t, ffl[ 9-10, R. 326.)
On January 18, 1967, plaintiff visited the Agency and expressed her sorrow and regret
over the loss of her son. Plaintiff inquired regarding the adoption, presumably to revoke her
consent, but was informed that she could not do so. Plaintiff claims to have made approximately

Thorazine is the trade name for chlorpromazine, which is used as a sedative or pain medication. Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 1227 (10th ed. 1993). Plaintiff claims she was "incapacitated" by the medication (App. Br. 10),
but there is no medical evidence in the record to support that conclusion. Sedation is not equated with incapacity, and
the taking of pain medication, such as Thorazine, in connection with child birth does not necessarily impair judgment
and vitiate adoption consent. See, e.g., Faulkenberry v. Elkins, 445 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. App. 1994) (upholding mother's
mental capacity to consent to adoption despite taking "a quadruple dose of her thorazine medication" two hours before
signing the consent); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P.2d 896, 898 (Ariz. App. 1975) (upheld adoption consent of
mature woman who signed after taking pain medication). In any event, as demonstrated below, the actual effect of
the medication is immaterial because plaintiff admittedly knew of her injury, i.e., the loss of her child, after her
medication wore off and she left the Hospital without her child.
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thirty more such inquiries of the Agency, but was denied relief. (Plaintiffs Affidavit,fflf26-28,
R.29L)
In 1990, twenty-three years after the relinquishment, plaintiff and her son were reunited.
On or about May 29,1990, plaintiff requested her son's medical records from the Hospital, and
the Hospital gave plaintiff a copy of her own medical records, showing the administration of
Thorazine. (Amended Complaint,ffif28-31, R. 116-17.)
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 20, 1993, alleging that she has felt the pain of
the loss of her child every day since the relinquishment in 1967. (Original Complaint, Tf 25, R.
5.) Plaintiff claims negligence, constructive fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and breach of contract in taking her adoption consent while she was allegedly incapacitated by
medication. (Amended Complaint, R. 113.)
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs cause of
action accrued in 1967, and that her action is therefore barred by applicable statutes of limitation.
Defendants demonstrated that the discovery rule has no application to the case because, among
other reasons, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of a cause of action many years
before she commenced this action. Defendants also presented alternative grounds for summary
judgment, such as laches and nonrecoverabiUty of damages for emotional distress. (R. 199-241.)
Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that her cause of action did not accrue until August 1990,
after she had procured a copy of her medical record showing that she had been administered
Thorazine in the Hospital. Plaintiff produced an affidavit from Gladys Carling, obtained ex parte
by plaintiffs counsel, stating that plaintiff was "sedated" when she signed the Release. ("First
Carling affidavit," R. 308.) Defendants objected to the Carling affidavit and requested that it be
5

stricken on the grounds that Carling is a represented adverse party, and that plaintiffs counsel's
ex parte contact violated rules of professional conduct. (R. 311-33).
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
plaintiffs action is barred by applicable statutes of limitation. The court reasoned that plaintiffs
cause of action accrued in 1967 when she realized that her child had been taken by the Agency,
allegedly against her will. The court held that the discovery rule did not apply because plaintiff
had inquiry notice and failed to take reasonable steps to discover her alleged incapacity.
However, the court refused to rule on the challenged affidavit and counsel's conduct in procuring
it, considering the issue moot. (R. 370, Add. 1-2.) This appeal and cross-appeal followed. (R.
374,381.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This action is barred by tort and contract statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs cause of action
is for the alleged taking of her adoption consent against her will. Her injury is the loss of her son.
Her alleged incapacity is not an injury, but a legal theory on which to invalidate her adoption
consent. Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967, upon the signing of her adoption consent,
regardless of her ignorance of her alleged incapacity. In 1967, plaintiff knew of her claimed
injury; she knew who had taken her child; and she had the legal theory of duress upon which to
base her cause of action for return of the child. Yet plaintiff took no legal action until 1993,26
years later. The statutes of limitation expired, at the latest, in 1973, 20 years before this action
was filed. Therefore, this action is barred, and the summary judgment should be affirmed.
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The discovery rule does not apply to toll the statutes of limitation until 1990, when
plaintiff allegedly discovered her incapacity. The discovery rule does not apply because plaintiff
cannot satisfy the threshold showing that she did not know and reasonably could not have known
of any cause of action prior to expiration of the limitations period. Plaintiff plainly did know of
her cause of action based on duress in 1967. Again, she knew her child had allegedly been taken
against her will; she knew who had taken the child; and she had the legal basis of duress to regain
the child. Therefore, the limitations period is not tolled until plaintiff discovered the alternative
legal theory of incapacity in 1990. In addition, the discovery rule is inapplicable because
plaintiff reasonably could have discovered her incapacity prior to the limitations bar. If her child
was taken against her will, she had a duty of reasonable inquiry, which should have included
obtaining her medical records in 1967, just as she did in 1990.
Even if plaintiff could satisfy the prerequisites for the discovery rule, none of the three
versions of that rule applies in this case. The statutory discovery rule in the Health Care
Malpractice Act does not apply because the district court ruled the Act's statute of limitations
inapplicable, and plaintiff did not appeal that ruling. The concealment version does not apply
because plaintiff reasonably could have discovered her alleged incapacity. Finally, the
exceptional circumstances version cannot apply because the limitations bar became a vested right
in 1973, long before this version of the discovery rule was adopted, in 1981. In any event, this
third version does not apply because greater injustice would result from permitting the claim than
from barring it. Therefore, the limitations period is not tolled by the discovery rule.
The summary judgment may also be affirmed on the alternative grounds of laches and
failure to state a claim for recovery of damages for emotional distress. The action is barred by
7

laches because plaintiffs delay in filing the action is unreasonable, and defendants are prejudiced
by the resulting loss of evidence to defend the claim. Regarding damages, plaintiff seeks
recovery only for her emotional distress. However, Utah law precludes recovery of damages for
purely emotional distress under her alleged theories of negligence, constructive fraud, and breach
of contract. Moreover, plaintiff cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the taking of plaintiff s adoption consent, at her request, for the socially desirable
purpose of providing a home for her child, is not "outrageous conduct." Because plaintiff cannot
obtain her requested relief, defendants are entitled to judgment.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to file a second
amended complaint. The proposed amendment merely added the names of other Church entities
that had nothing to do with the relinquishment. The amendment raised no new facts, claims, or
issues, and added nothing of substance to the case. Moreover, the amendment would not have
altered the court's ruling. Therefore, the amendment was properly denied as a futile act.
On the cross-appeal, plaintiffs counsel violated rules of professional conduct in meeting
ex parte with defendant Carling for the purpose of obtaining her affidavit. The issue is not moot,
and even if it were, this Court should still review the matter because it involves an issue of
importance to the public and the bar, the conduct is likely to recur if not corrected, and the issue
is capable of evading judicial review. Rule 4.2 bars the contact with Carling on the grounds that
she is a party defendant and, as a former employee of the defendant Agency, her conduct is the
subject of the litigation and is imputed to the Agency. The appropriate remedy is to strike the
affidavit obtained by plaintiffs counsel and to award defendants the costs and attorney fees
incurred in obtaining relief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I:

PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, FILED 26 YEARS AFTER HER CLAIMED
LOSS, IS BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

A. The Action Is Barred By Tort and Contract Statutes of Limitation,
The purpose of statutes of limitation is "to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Becton Dickinson and Co. v. Reese, 668
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues. U.C.A. § 78-12-1. The general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon the
occurrence of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Moreover, Utah law is
clear that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of
the statute of limitations." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); see also Retherford
v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah App. 1996).
This action is governed by both tort and contract statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs cause
of action is for the alleged wrongful taking of her adoption consent. She asserts four different
legal theories for relief: negligence, constructive fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of contract. A cause of action that is pleaded in both tort and contract is
governed by the limitations period applicable to each theory. See Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 267 n.2 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, the three tort claims are
governed by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), which bars after four years "[a]n action for relief not
otherwise provided for by law." See, e.g., O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139,
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1141 (Utah 1991); Retherford, supra, 844 P.2d at 975-77, The contract claim is governed by
section 78-12-23(2), which bars after six years "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation, or
liability founded upon an instrument in writing." See Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182
(Utah App. 1987). While two different limitation periods apply, both periods began to run at the
same time, upon accrual of the cause of action. See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah
1996) (a cause of action cannot be split for limitation purposes; "once some harm is manifest, the
limitations period begins to run on all claims"). The tort claims accrued when the elements of
each claim came into existence. Retherford, supra, at 975. The contract claim accrued upon
breach of the contract. Koulis, supra, at 1186. All claims accrued at the same time, upon accrual
of the underlying cause of action.
Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967, and is therefore barred by both statutes of
limitation. All four of plaintiff s legal theories are based on the allegation that she was
incapacitated by medication at the time she signed the consent. Accordingly, the alleged tortious
act for all three torts, as well as the alleged breach of contract, was the single act of taking
plaintiffs adoption consent. That challenged act occurred on January 16, 1967; therefore,
plaintiffs cause of action accrued on that day, 30 years ago. On that day, plaintiffs claimed
injury, the loss of her son, occurred, and plaintiff knew that her child was being placed for
adoption by the Agency. Therefore, all elements of the cause of action were present: she had an
injuiy, a defendant, and legal theories for relief Furthermore, as noted above, plaintiffs claimed
ignorance of her cause of action, resulting from her unawareness of her alleged incapacity, does
not prevent the running of the statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Myers v. McDonald, supra, at 86.
Therefore, plaintiffs cause of action was barred at least by 1973, twenty years before this action
10

was filed. See Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah App. 1996) (holding that four-year
catch-all statute of limitations barred paternity action filed by adult child more than twenty years
after learning the identity of her father).
B. The Discovery Rule Does Not Apply To Toll The Statutes of Limitation.
Plaintiff argues that her action is not barred because the discovery rule operated to toll the
statutes of limitation until 1990, when she supposedly discovered that she lacked capacity to sign
the consent due to the Thorazine. Only then, she asserts, did she know of her "legal injury" and
have a cause of action. (App. Br. 27-30.) However, the discovery rule has no application to this
case.
The discovery rule is an exception to the general rule, stated above, that limitation periods
commence upon accrual of the cause of action, regardless of ignorance of the cause of action.
Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until discovery of facts
forming the basis of the cause of action. E.g., Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d
1229, 1231 (Utah 1995); O'Nealv. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah
1991). Whether the discovery rule applies is a question of law. Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d
868, 869 (Utah 1990). The discovery rule may apply under three circumstances: (1) when
mandated by statute; (2) when the cause of action has been concealed by the defendant; and (3)
when the case presents exceptional circumstances that make application of the statute of
limitations irrational or unjust. Walker Drug, supra, at 1231; Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838
P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). None of these circumstances exists in this case. In any event,
plaintiff cannot establish the threshold requirement for any application of the discovery rule--a
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showing that she did not know and reasonably could not have known of any possible cause of
action before the limitations period expired.
1. Threshold Showing of No Cause of Action. Case law is clear that in order to invoke
any version of the discovery rule, plaintiff must first show that she did not know and reasonably
could not have known of any cause of action prior to the limitations bar. Failure to comply with
this threshold requirement can be established as a matter of law. E.g., Walker Drug, supra, 902
P.2d at 1231 (affirming summary judgment as to exceptional circumstances and concealment
versions of the discovery rule); Atwoodv. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992)
(affirming summary judgment as to discovery argument based on medical malpractice statute).
Plaintiff has failed to make this threshold showing.
Plaintiff had a cause of action for revocation of her adoption consent, based on duress,
from the day she signed the consent in January 1967. The essence of plaintiff s case is that the
Agency allegedly took plaintiffs baby for adoption against her will. In January 1967, plaintiff
knew of her injury, the loss of her child; she knew that the Agency had taken the child for
adoptive placement; and, based on her multiple inquiries and requests for return of the child, she
obviously believed that the child had been taken against her will. (If the child was not taken
against her will, then plaintiff has no injury and no claim.) Given these facts, indisputably known
to plaintiff in January 1967, she had a cause of action for revocation of her consent based on
duress from that time forward. See, e.g., DP v. Social Service and Child Welfare Dept., 19 Utah
2d 311,431 P.2d 547 (1967) (unwed mother's adoption consent revoked based on duress and
incapacity). Accordingly, plaintiffs claimed ignorance of her incapacity theory in 1967 does not
prevent the accrual of her cause of action based on the alternative theory of duress. As observed
12

in Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996), "The limitations
period is postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal
theories." (Emp. added.) See O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1144-45 (refusing to apply discovery
rule in sex abuse case because, while the plaintiff was psychologically unable to reveal the abuse
earlier, he did know of the abuse and the perpetrator within the limitations period); Pritzlaffv.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 786 (Wis. 1995) (barring claim for illicit sexual
relationship filed 27 years after the relationship ended; discovery rule did not apply because,
while the plaintiff may not have known of her claim for emotional distress when the relationship
ended, she did know the facts supporting a claim for civil battery, and her cause of action
therefore accrued from that date).
Not only did plaintiff know the facts supporting a duress claim, the record also shows that
she reasonably should have discovered her alleged incapacity claim before the limitations period
expired. The two relevant considerations are (1) whether plaintiff was on inquiry notice; and (2)
whether she exercised due diligence. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, supra, 920 P.2d at 579.
The test for inquiry notice is whether the circumstances would suggest to a person of ordinary
intelligence that a loss, injury or wrong had occurred. If so, the plaintiff must be reasonably
diligent in investigating the facts surrounding the loss which forms the basis of her cause of
action. Id. In this case, plaintiff admits that she knew of her loss from the beginning and
repeatedly inquired of the Agency regarding that loss. Her admission of "over thirty" inquiries to
the Agency belies her claim of having "no suspicion of wrongdoing." (App. Br. 30.) See Hove v.
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (plaintiffs repeated complaints to several doctors over two
years established her knowledge of a possible claim). If the relinquishment was truly
13

involuntary, plaintiff had a duty to inquire how her consent could have been obtained against her
will. Those inquiries reasonably should have included requests for copies of her medical records
from the Hospital, not simply inquiries regarding payment of the bill, which she knew had been
paid by the Agency. If plaintiff had requested her medical record in 1967, she would have
received it, as demonstrated by the ease with which she acquired the record in 1990. If plaintiff
had been dissatisfied with the responses to her inquiries, judicial processes could have been
invoked to assist her. These facts show, as a matter of law, that plaintiff did not exercise
reasonable diligence to discover her alleged incapacity prior to expiration of the limitations
period. Therefore, she is charged with knowledge of what a reasonable inquiry would have
disclosed, and she is precluded from invoking the discovery rule. Anderson, supra, at 579-80;
Walker Drug, supra, 902 P.2d at 1323; Warren, supra, 838 P.2d at 1129.2
In summary, because plaintiff had actual knowledge of the facts supporting a claim for
duress, and she reasonably could have discovered the facts supporting her claim for incapacity,

The district court correctly ruled that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover her alleged
incapacity:
All of the affidavits and documentation in the file indicates that Miss Safsten knew . . . that
there was not a day that passed that Plaintiff has not felt deep heartache and void for the loss of her
child.
She—the act that damaged her was the consent document. The doctor prescribed the
Thorazine. The nurse, probably, at St. Benedict's probably administered it. And that was a readily
discoverable fact. If it wasn't voluntarily surrendered by the execution of a consent, certainly a
subpoena would have provided that information very quickly.

The Courtfinds,as a matter of law from the facts stated herein, that she knew that she was
injured once she had her full faculties following the birth of the child; that she didn't take steps to
reasonably discover what, if any, the cause of any incapacity was.
The Courtfindsthat, by any applicable statute of limitations, the case on all causes of action
is time-barred
[Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, R. 390-91.]
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plaintiff is precluded from invoking the discovery rule to toll the statutes of limitation. In any
event, as demonstrated below, none of the three versions of the discovery rule could apply in this
case.
2. Statutory Discovery Rule. Plaintiff does not expressly cite any statute mandating
application of the discovery rule, but she relies on medical malpractice cases that are based on
the discovery rule in U.C.A. § 78-14-4(1), Health Care Malpractice Act. For example, plaintiff
cites Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), and Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.,
784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that her cause of action did not accrue until
discovery of her "legal injury," defined in Foil as "discovery of injury and the negligence which
resulted in the injury." 601 P.2d at 148. Plaintiff extrapolates that interpretation of the medical
malpractice statute of limitations to require discovery of both her injury (the loss of her son) and
its supposed cause (her alleged incapacity). (App. Br. 27-29.) However, as the district court
ruled, the medical malpractice statute of limitations does not apply in this case. (R. 370, Add. 2.)
Therefore, neither can the notion of "legal injury," derived from that statute, apply in this case.
Plaintiff cannot be permitted to escape the limitations and repose provisions of that statute, while
invoking its discovery provision. See Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., supra, 823 P.2d at 1065
(rejecting application of the medical malpractice case law and discovery rule to avoid the bar of a
products liability statute of limitations).3
3. Alleged Concealment. Plaintiff argues that the discovery rule should apply because
the Agency concealed the fact of her incapacity. Plaintiff relies exclusively on the affidavit of

Defendants have chosen to abandon that portion of their cross-appeal challenging the district court's ruling that
the medical malpractice statutes of limitation and repose do not apply. (Order, R. 370, Add. 2, K 1; Notice of CrossAppeal, R. 381.)

15

defendant social worker Gladys Carling, which states that plaintiff appeared "sedated" when she
signed the adoption consent. (R. 308; App. Br. 36-37.) However, as noted previously, sedation
is not the equivalent of incapacity; plaintiff has provided absolutely no medical evidence that she
was incapacitated. Even Gladys Carling, in her second affidavit, affirms her belief that plaintiff
had sufficient mental capacity to know what she was doing. (R. 326.)

Absent medical proof of

incapacity, plaintiff cannot establish that the Agency concealed her incapacity. Furthermore, as
demonstrated in Point IV, below, the first Carling affidavit should be stricken as a sanction for
plaintiffs counsel's improper ex parte interview with Carling.
In any event, even if plaintiff could establish her incapacity, in order to invoke the
concealment prong of the discovery rule plaintiff must show that she could not reasonably have
discovered the fact concealed. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra, 920 P.2d at 579.
As demonstrated in argument B.l., above, the plaintiffs perception that her child had been taken
against her will imposed upon her a duty to inquire regarding the circumstances of her
relinquishment. As a matter of law, plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence to discover the
facts surrounding her relinquishment, including her alleged incapacity. She did not ask the
Hospital for her medical records; she did not discuss the matter with her physician; she did not
ask the Agency if she was incapacitated when she signed the consent; and she has not alleged
that she ever expressly requested the return of her child. Plaintiff maintains only that she
"diligently inquired" of the Agency, in general terms, "regarding the adoption and her son."
(App. Br. 37.) The Agency responded, as it was legally required to do, that it could not reveal
the confidential information surrounding the adoption. In short, the information plaintiff claims
the Agency concealed, the same information plaintiff claims she discovered in 1990, was
16

available to plaintiff in 1967. Therefore, plaintiff cannot invoke the concealment prong of the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Anderson, supra, at 580; Warren v. Provo City,
supra^ 838 P.2d at 1129-30 (rejecting concealment claim because the plaintiff could cite no
affirmative representation on which he relied, and he failed to take reasonable steps to pursue his
claim); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987) (fraud claim arising from
gas station lease was barred by statute of limitations because the plaintiff could have discovered
the basis for her claim 14 years earlier by merely requesting a copy of the lease).
4. Exceptional CircumstanceSo This third version of the discovery rule allows tolling
of the statute of limitations if the case presents "exceptional circumstances" that render
application of the limitations bar "irrational or unjust." The hardship of the limitations bar on the
plaintiff is weighed against the prejudice to the defendant from the difficulties of proof caused by
the passage of time. O'Neal supra, 821 P.2d at 1143; Myers v. McDonald, supra, 635 P.2d at
87. This balancing test is a question of law. Klinger v. Kightly, supra, 791 P.2d at 872.
However, the rule has no application in this case for two reasons.
First, the exceptional circumstances discovery rule cannot be applied in this case because
the rule was adopted after plaintiff's cause of action was already barred. This form of the
discovery rule was judicially created by the Utah Supreme Court in Myers v. McDonald, supra,
in 1981. See O'Neal, supra, 821 P.2d at 1143. However, plaintiffs cause of action, having
accrued in 1967, was time-barred at least by 1973, long before Myers was decided. When the
limitations period expired in 1973, defendants acquired a vested right to invoke the statute of
limitations defense to bar the action. Roark v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058,1062 (Utah 1995).
Because the statute of limitations defense becomes a vested right as of the time the limitations
17

period expires, no subsequent change in the statute or its judicial application can operate
retroactively to revive a previously barred claim. Id. at 1062-63; In re Swan 's Estate, 79 P.2d
999,1002 (Utah 1938). Accordingly, this Court is precluded, as a matter of law, from applying
the exceptional circumstances discovery rule to revive plaintiffs previously barred cause of
action.
Second, even if the balancing test is applied, the prejudice to defendants outweighs any
injustice to plaintiff. Refusal to apply the limitations bar would cause terrible prejudice to
defendants resulting from difficulties of proof caused by the long passage of time. Over the past
30 years, records have been lost or discarded, and witnesses have died, moved, or forgotten the
events at issue. Plaintiff claims that no documents and records have been lost or destroyed (App.
Br. 35), but plaintiff has produced no such documents for the record. Moreover, the Court can
take judicial notice that after 30 years, the memory of any living witness, such as plaintiffs
physician, nurse, and family members, will have significantly faded. As a consequence,
defendants would have difficulty disproving plaintiffs claim of incapacity. On the other hand,
the facts reveal no injustice to plaintiff in applying the limitations bar. From the beginning in
1967, plaintiff knew of her loss, knew who to sue, and had a legal cause of action to obtain relief;
yet, she failed to file this action until 1993,26 years later. Plaintiffs delay is simply
inexcusable, and she should not be permitted to invoke an equitable remedy to pursue her claim.
This is precisely the type of case for which statutes of limitation are intended, and greater
injustice would result from permitting the claim than from barring it. See, e.g., Pritzlaffv.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, supra, 533 N.W.2d at 788 ("sound public policy requires that the
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discovery rule should not save a claim" for emotional injuries filed 27 years after accrual; the
long passage of time increases the potential for fraudulent claims that are difficult to defend).
In summary, plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 1967 and was barred, at the latest, in
1973, regardless of her ignorance of claimed incapacity. The discovery rule does not apply
because plaintiff knew of the facts for a cause of action based on duress in 1967, and she
reasonably should have discovered her alternative claim based on incapacity. In any event, none
of the three versions of the discovery rule applies in this case. Therefore, the limitations period
was not tolled, and her cause of action is barred.4
POINT 11

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY BE AFFIRMED ON THE
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS OF LACHES AND FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS.

The law is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the lower court judgment on
any proper ground, even though different from that relied upon by the lower court. E.g., DeBry
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995). In the district court, in addition to the statute of

Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is precluded by material issues of fact relating primarily to the
discoverability of her incapacity. (App. Br. 40-42.) However, as demonstrated above, the reasonableness of plaintiff s
inquiries regarding her claimed incapacity is relevant only to the threshold and concealment elements of the discovery
rule. Regardless of plaintiffs incapacity claim, her cause of action is barred, and the discovery rule is inapplicable,
because plaintiff indisputably knew of facts supporting a cause of action based on duress. This threshold determination
of a known cause of action, is made as a matter of law. See, e.g., Walker Drug Co. v.LaSal Oil Co., supra, 902 P.2d
at 1231 (affirming summary judgment); Atwoodv. Sturm, Ruger & Co., supra, 823 P.2d at 1065 (affirming summary
judgment). Even the concealment version of the discovery rule can be decided as a matter of law. See, e.g., Warren
v. Provo City, supra, 838 P.2d at 1129-30 (affirming summary judgment); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, supra,
920 P.2d at 579 (affirming summary judgment). Accordingly, discoverability of plaintiff s claimed incapacity need not
even be reached under the threshold analysis and may be decided as a matter of law under the concealment analysis.
Plaintiff also argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court supposedly decided
the merits of plaintiffs incapacity claim. (App. Br. 43-45.) However, nothing in the court's order supports this
assertion. Whether plaintiff was in fact incapacitated when she signed the consent is not material to the statute of
limitations defense and was not decided by the district court. The limitations defense was properly decided as a matter
of law, as it has been in the cited cases.
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limitations defense, defendants argued that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
laches and failure to state a claim for recovery of emotional distress damages. (R. 223-29.)
While the district court based its ruling on the statutes of limitation, this Court may affirm on
either of these alternative grounds, if necessary.
A. This Action Is Barred By the Equitable Defense of Laches.
The equitable doctrine of laches may apply in lieu of a statute of limitations. As set forth
in Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources International, 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah App. 1995):
Laches is an equitable doctrine "based on the maxim that 'equity aids the
vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.'" [Citation omitted.] "The doctrine
of laches may apply in equity, whether or not a statute of limitations also applies
and whether or not an applicable statute of limitation has been satisfied." [Quoting
American Tierra v. City ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992).]
To establish laches, the defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in
bringing the action; and (2) the defendant is prejudiced by that delay. Nilson-Newey, supra, at
314 (barring action for accounting of real estate venture filed 35 years after venture began
because the plaintiff had long known that the property had been developed without distribution
of profits). See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 n.4 (Utah App. 1992) (barring action
of mother to set aside adoption decree filed three years after decree); Borland v. Chandler, 733
P.2d 144,146 (Utah 1987) ("principles of equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice").
The conditions for application of laches are satisfied in this case. For the reasons
demonstrated under the statute of limitations analysis, above, plaintiffs 26-year delay in
bringing this action is unreasonable. She knew in 1967 that her child had allegedly been taken
for adoption against her will; she had a defendant; and she had a legal theory of duress. Yet,
plaintiff delayed in filing this action until 1993. It makes no difference that plaintiff did not
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discover an alternative legal theory until 1990. Plaintiff clearly "slumbered on her rights." As a
result of plaintiff s delay, defendants are prejudiced by the difficulties of proof caused by the
long passage of time. The availability, quantity, and quality of evidence are naturally and
unavoidably impaired. Defendants would certainly be disadvantaged by having to defend this
action with incomplete information to rebut plaintiffs claims. Therefore, the laches bar must be
applied to prevent injustice.
B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State A Claim For Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress,,
Plaintiff alleges negligence, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress in obtaining her adoption consent, with the alleged injury being
the loss of her son. (Amended Complaint,fflj41-43, 50-51, 56, 60-62.) Plaintiff alleges no
personal injury or economic loss. She seeks only damages for the "heartache" or emotional
distress resulting from the loss of her child. However, established Utah law precludes recovery
of damages for emotional distress under any of the first three legal theories. Moreover, plaintiff
has failed to establish any right to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Utah law strictly limits recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Such damages may be recovered only when they result from an accompanying physical injury, or
when the claimant is within the "zone of danger" when witnessing physical injury to others. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988); Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg Med. Center,
791 P.2d 193, 200-01 (Utah 1990); Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992). In
this case, plaintiff does not allege that she was injured physically or was within the zone of
danger from another's injury. Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim must fail as a matter of law
because she has alleged no compensable injury.
21

Neither can damages for emotional distress be recovered under theories of constructive
fraud or breach of contract. In Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 68 (Utah
App. 1992), this Court explained that both these theories are designed to protect economic
interests and restore pecuniary loss, not to recompense vague emotional injury:
[DJeceit is an economic, not a dignitary tort, and resembles, in the interest it seeks
to protect, a contract claim more than a tort claim. For this reason, though strong
men may cry at the loss of money, separate recovery for mental anguish is
usually denied in deceit cases, just as it is denied in contract cases, simply
because emotional distress, though resulting naturally enough from many frauds,
is not one of the interests the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit cases.
[Quoting D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 9.2 at 602 (1973), emp.
added.
Because fraud is an economic tort, "the better reasoned approach is to disallow recovery of
emotional distress damages in a fraud action." Turner, supra, at 68. See also Restatement (2d)
of Contracts § 353 (denying emotional distress damages for breach of contract because they are
difficult to verify and measure in the absence of physical injury). Accordingly, plaintiffs
constructive fraud and contract claims must also be denied, as a matter of law, because the
requested relief cannot be granted.
Finally, plaintiff cannot recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the act of taking plaintiffs adoption consent does not constitute "outrageous conduct," as
required by Utah law. For example, the leading case of Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347
(Utah 1961), limited recovery to situations in which the defendant's "actions are of such a nature
as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality." See Restatement (2d) of Torts § 46 (the conduct at issue
must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
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bounds of decency;
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community"). This standard has been satisfied only in the few cases involving a course of
conduct calculated to harass the victim over a period of time. See Samms, supra, and Retherford

single act alleged to be in violation of an agreement, such as a wrongful discharge from
employment or even lying to an employee.,. See Sperber v. Galigher Ash i ' o 74 ) P.2d 1025,
1028 (Utah 1987); Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1995);
Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Utah App. 1994). Accordingly, the Agency's

providing a home for her child, plainly does not rise to the level of "outrageous" conduct required
for recovery under intentional infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, that determination can
be made as a matter of law. See Sperber, supra, at 1028-29; and Robertson, supra, at 1388-89
(both denying the claim on summary judgment) Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary
judgmti
In summary, this Court should alternatively affirm the district court on the grounds of
laches and unavailability of damages for emotional distress.5

"The proper remedy for entry into a contract while incapacitated is, of course, to disaffirm the contract upon
regaining capacity and sue for rescission of the contract. If not timely disaffirmed, the voidable contract is deemed
ratified, and subsequent relief may be barred by laches or equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Smith v. Williamson, 30 P. 753,
754 (Utah 1892) (enforcing voidable contract made while intoxicated because it was ratified upon becoming sober);
Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968) (party seeking to rescind contract based on deception must act
promptly or be bound by the contract); 41 Am fur, 2d Incompetent Persons §§ 66y 80-81, 85, 87 (1995 Interim Siipp,).
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POINT III:

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT.

Prior to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff moved to file a second
amended complaint. The stated purposes of the amendment were to insert the names of Doe
defendants, present a more clear statement of plaintiff s case, and to provide defendants better
notice of the claims in order to assist them "to respond better." (App. Br. 46; R. 140.)
Defendants opposed the amendment on the grounds that the named Doe defendants had nothing
to do with plaintiffs claims; the amendment alleged no new facts or claims; and, instead of
clarifying plaintiffs claims, the amendment would unduly complicate them. (R. 148-54.)
Moreover, defendants never requested an amendment and did not consider one necessary for
their benefit. The district court agreed with defendants, noting that "[n]othing of substance is
added by the proposed amendment" and properly held that "it should be denied as 6fruitless.'" (R.
197, Add. 4-6.)
After a responsive pleading has been filed, a complaint may be amended only with leave
of court, and only "when justice so requires." Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P. Permission to amend
is discretionary with the district court, and a reviewing court may not disturb the district court's
ruling absent "a clear abuse of discretion." Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190
(Utah App. 1987); see also Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah App.
1993). Moreover, leave to amend should be denied when the proposed amendment adds nothing
of substance to the case and is therefore fruitless, legally insufficient, or futile. See, e.g., Jensen
v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1992); Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1046 (Utah App. 1994).
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the case and served no useful purpose. Even now, plaintiff fails to explain how the granting of

summary judgment. The district court would have reached the same result. Because the
proposed second amended complaint served no purpose and would have been subject to all of the

and Andalex, supra; Dupler v Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960) (affirming denial
of motion to amend complaint because amendment presented no new theory or claim and
effected no substantial change in the issues).
POINT IV:

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO STRIKE THE
FIRST CARLING AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL
OBTAINED THROUGH INAPPROPRIATE EX PARTE CONTACT
WITH DEFENDANT CARLINGo

In response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed the first
Affidavit of Gh

in 1967. (R<, 306,) The affidavit was obtained through an ex parte meeting between defendant
Carling and plaintiffs counsel. (Affidavit of Richard G. Hackwell, R. 347.) Defendants filed a
motion for protective order and sanctions, including the striking of the first Carling Affidavit, on
the grounds that it was procured through a violation of rules of professional conduct. (R. 311,
314,316,318.) In support of their motion, defendants attached a second Affidavit of Gladys G.
Carling, affirming that she was represented by counsel for defendants. (R. 324,fflf2-3.)
Defendants' motion for protective order and sanctions was to be heard at the same time as their
motion for summary judgment. However, after granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the district court ruled that the separate motion for protective order and sanctions was
"moot." (R. 363, 368, 370.) This Court, while affirming the summary judgment, should address
the merits of this cross-appeal, not only to correct the record by striking the first Carling
affidavit, but to communicate the impropriety of the conduct by which it was obtained, for
guidance of counsel in this case as well as other counsel in future cases.
Review of plaintiff s counsel's ex parte contact with defendant Carling should not be
denied on grounds of mootness. An issue is "moot" only when the requested judicial relief
cannot affect the rights of the parties. E.g., Burkett v. Schwendiman, 111 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah
1989). The judicial relief of striking the first Carling affidavit could affect the rights of the
parties if further proceedings are required, either on further appeal or remand. In addition, a
further sanction, such as payment of costs and attorney fees, may be necessary to adequately
communicate the impropriety of the conduct at issue to opposing counsel and other members of
the bar in this state. Accordingly, defendants hereby request such further relief, which this Court
is authorized to grant. See Rule 40, Utah R. App. P. This monetary relief certainly will affect
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issue is considered moot, this Court should still review the conduct at issue because it affects
important interests of the public and the bar, is likely to recur if not corrected, and, as it involves
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Burkett, supra, at 44; Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) ("[t]he law provides no
exemption j
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Proceeding to the merits of the issue, the ex parte contact of plaintiff s counsel with
Gladys Carling, a represented adverse party, violated the express prohibition of Rule 4.2, Utah R.
ofProf

•
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
authorized by law to do so. [Add. 12.]

Gladys Carling is a "Doe" defendant in this action. She is the Agency social worker who acted
on behalf of the Agency in taking plaintiffs adoption consent; moreover, that single act is
alleged as the only factual and legal basis for Agency liability. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that
"Does 1 through 10 are agents or employees" of the Agency (Amend. Comp., 14), and that an
Vinplos n1" ol lii' AJJCIH \ ohl mini phi
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Carling in alleging that "Defendants saw plaintiffs physical condition" and violated various
rights and a

obtaining plaintn

..adoption

(U., 111L,! I I I .'ill. ") I. 6U.)

Of course, only Carling "saw" plaintiff and obtained her consent. Furthermore, Carling verified
in her second affidavit that she met with defendants' counsel on August 2,1995, to discuss
defense of the cast1 <iiirf llwi ^lif is ivphMiilnl in illliii u I inn In ilrlrnse counsel |I>! LIS,)

Accordingly, the ex parte meeting of plaintiff s counsel with Carling on April 8, 1996 (R. 347)
violated the express terms of Rule 4.2. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990)
(applying the rule in a criminal action).6
Gladys Carling should also be considered a "party" to this action as a former Agency
employee whose conduct is the subject of this litigation. As such, plaintiffs counsel's ex parte
contact still violated Rule 4.2, as explained in the official comment to the rule:
In the case of an organization,... this Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may
constitute an admission on the part of the organization. [Add. 13, emp. added.]
The entire focus of this action is to impute Carting's conduct, in taking plaintiffs adoption
consent, to the Agency for the purpose of holding the Agency liable in damages for that conduct.
In addition, plaintiff relies on Carting's statement, that "plaintiff was sedated" when she signed
the consent, as an admission by the Agency that plaintiff was incapacitated. (App. Br. 11, 20,
36-37.) Given the central focus on Carting's conduct and statements as the specific and sole
grounds for alleged Agency liability, Carling should be considered a "party" for purposes of Rule
4.2, precluding ex parte contact by plaintiffs counsel.
Several cases have interpreted Rule 4.2 to prohibit ex parte contact with former
employees whose conduct is the subject of the litigation. For example, in Public Service Elec.
and Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Services, 745 F. Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990), the

Given that Carling had previously discussed defense of the case with defense counsel, the subsequent meeting
with plaintiffs counsel may also have violated Carting's legal right to the attorney-client privilege, as further
prohibited by Rule 4.4, governing respect for the legal rights of third persons. See ABA Formal Op. 91-359, "Contact
With Former Employee of Adverse Corporate Party" (1991).
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establish wrongful denial of insurance coverage. The court examined Rule 4.2 and recognized
that its purpose is to prevent the professionally trained lawyer from extracting damaging
concessions from the unshielded h\itii.ini in

i .if III i"1"1 I lot n a n ,i fi on unit' employee"'*• i Is or

statements can be imputed to the employer to the same degree as those of a current employee.
/J" ill III III

i mi i d u i g l ) , I hi: i mill 1) 'hi illliiil former e m p l o y e e s w h o s e acts are imputable to the

employer "cannot be the subject of informal ex parte investigative fact finding." Id. at 1042.
Rather, plaintiffs counsel should follow the deposition process as "the best method of

Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 253 (D. Kan. 1988) (denying ex parte interviews
^ j k £QTmCT

e m p i 0 y e e s IA( h 0 m a

j i i a v e b e e n involved in the allegedly unlawful conduct and

whose actions could be imputed to the defendant for purposes of civil liability); Amarin

Plastics,

Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987) (prohibition on ex parte contact
applin ". mo I in'on in n u p l o u T s uhose i uinlii i r, ill ,un| i

ation); I Jni\ ei sity Pi liei its,

Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328-29 (D. Pa. 1990) (sanction for improper ex parte contact
was exclusion from the record of the information obtained).
In summary, the purpose of Rule 4.2 is manifest in this case, as plaintiffs counsel
extracted from Gladys Carling the admission that "plaintiff was sedated" when she signed the
consent Ill1"1 illll I If defense i ouiiisrl had been iiiesenl lot i los.s-rsamination < iiilinj.1 timid
have clarified, as she did in her second affidavit, that, even if plaintiff was sedated, she still had
sufficient mental capacity to know what she was doing, (R 326 Because plaintiff seeks to
impute Carling's acts and statements to the Agency for the purpose of holding the Agency liable,
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and because Carling's conduct is the subject of this litigation, she should be considered a "party"
for purposes of Rule 4.2. Therefore, opposing counsel's ex parte contact was improper, and an
appropriate sanction should be imposed, including striking of the first Carling affidavit and
payment of costs and attorney fees incurred in obtaining this relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order of summary
judgment in favor of defendants. In addition, this Court should review counsel's ex parte contact
with Gladys Carling, rule the contact improper, and impose a sanction striking the affidavit
thereby obtained and awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees to defendants.
Respectfully submitted this J _ day of February, 1997.

KIRTON & McCONKIE

David M. McConkie
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/
Cross-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS this i L d a y of February, 1997, in the United States mail,
postage prepaid to the foil *

Richard G. Hackwell
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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TJjfrd Judicial District

David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFSTEN,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 930902822PI

vs.
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah
corporation, and DOES 1-10,

I

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

r,

Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Kenneth
Rigtrup

M.

McConkie; plaintiff was represented by Richard G. Hackwell. The Court, having considered the
written memoranu

guments

: parties,

"

1. The statute of limitations and statute of repose in the Health Care Malpractice Act,
U.CA. § 78-14-4(1), do not apply because the taking of plaintiffs adoption consent does not
constitute provision of medical care to the plaintiff.
2. Plaintiffs tort claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-1225(3), and plaintiffs contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations in U.CA. § 78-12-23(2).
3. Plaintiff knew of her injury, the loss of her child, upon leaving the hospital in 1967,
and her cause of action accrued at that time.
4. The administration of thorazine was reasonably discoverable by plaintiff within the
limitations period following her release from the hospital, but plaintiff failed to take reasonable
steps to discover the cause of her alleged incapacity.
5. Plaintiff was on notice to inquire about the circumstances surrounding the taking
of her consent because, as she alleged, "not a day has passed since January, 1967, that plaintiff
has not felt the deep heartache and void of the loss of her child and the loss of the joys of
motherhood."
6. Plaintiffs action is time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations, and her
Amended Complaint is accordingly dismissed with prejudice.
7. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
8. With the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants' separate
Motion for Protective Order, Sanctions, and to Quash Subpoena is rendered moot.

-2-

OTO£

DATED this J L day o ^ & ^ , 1996.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be n lai led the • toi egc

-. ft- •

1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Richard G. Hackwell
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534
Attorney for Plaintiff
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FIUO DISTRICT CWJR:
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 0 1996
r>«outvClerW

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501
RULING

HANCY 6. SAFSTEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

MS.

930902822

XDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a
Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

While plaintiff's proposed "Second Amended Complaint" adds
additional named parties, it alleges no actionable misconduct on
the part of such additional parties.

Also, the "Second Amended

Complaint11 alleges that the additional defendants "supervised and
established policy," but it does not identify any specific policies
or acts of supervision.
Nothing of substance is added by the proposed amendment, and
it should be denied as "fruitless."

Plaintiff's Motion for

Permission to File Second Amended Complaint is denied.
Counsel for defendants shall submit an appropriate Order
hereon.
Dated this ZP

^^
day of February, 1996.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE V^'^STOSS*

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 6 1996
3y.

David M. McConkie (A2154)
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

^OlltvOorW

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NANC

SAFSTEN,
ORDER

Plaintiff,

vs.
-ase No. 930902822PI
LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., a Utah
corporation; THE CORPORATION OF
THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY
SAINTS.
*. Utah
corporation, and DOES 1 1 ,

.dge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Motion

Permissk

Second Amended Complaint came

before the court for decision, without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of
Judicial Administration.

having considered

opposing memoraiK

arguments of the parties, entered a Ruling on February 20,1996 denying plaintiffs motion.

Based on that Ruling, the Court now hereby orders that plaintiffs motion is
denied for the reasons that the proposed amendment (1) alleges no actionable misconduct
by the additional parties; (2) identifies no specific policies to be at issue; and (3) adds
nothing of substance to the case.
DATED this 2JQ ~ciay of March, 1996.

JUJJ£^
istricO Court Judge ()

^ X ^ S ^ "

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J*

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this (

day

of March, 1996, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Richard G. Hackwell, Esq,
Mclntyre Building, 8th Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1534
Attorney for Plaintiff

K^nsyuju

<(D (h-^TJU^^

-2-

i) f a O / t c

STATE OF 7t-Zc7u

)

COUNTY OTUU:LC^.

)
*

******
I,

)"( A..->•»-<?• %.., SJ<y.i..<,L,t,^

^2. t*s/ts

,

3

*

*

/J/tj^C

*

J\A*-rt^'.^>

being first duly sworn, depose and say.
~

am the unmarried mother of a certain W f ^ / c
.• lL*\ **fi?^^ ^

the white race born ww .,.« «,

19j^2t

,

*

at Bald rMlrf

Coun*

- conceived and born nil

.

3* j««.

, ( 1

T-fe,

child of
M

^

„,* i.

6

. ^ ^k

*

have been in oole custody and control of said-child since
the birth of said child,

unable to give said child a proper name.

That I hereby Covenant
D

' F»

1

a

!1: ,,

" '' .1 ' " f 1 '1 ' !::

General Board Associationt Hereinafter called

JM "Licensed Agency," will accept said child for placement or adoption, that I
r attemp^

shall never interfere

any manner *

«

Id child, or to

ascertain the whereabout?
':aoever9
htreby consent that the Licensed Agency, may make provisions
lor the mtdloal

of laid child, give consent for operations, make other

deoiaions
aEid

c h i W |

htreby release all of my right, title and interest
aald child and to tht earnings of laid child and also
the cuitody m d aont*>

nereby

authorize and raqueit said Licensed Agency

t* a.

discretion, to place said

child in a home for adoption,
hereby release said child.
cmrpfii! I j
cr interest in and

iver

-aid child «.-

child or to the custody or contro

~ ~ r r -•:•*•.•• flf»<**
again olaim

.* .

• - service \* arnings
<\*
EXHIBIT A

0

6.

That said Licensed Agency may place said child with any person

or persons of good moral character who may be able to furnish said minor child
vith a proper name, home and care, and that said person or persons may adopt
said child to the end that it may have a home, name and proper care, and that I
hereby consent and agree that the question of fitness of the person or persons
who shall adopt said child and who is or are to have the care, custody and
control of said child shall be left exclusively to the judgement of 6aid
Licensed Agency, and the Judge of the Court before whom the adoption proceedings
may be held.
7.

That I hereby waive notice of any and all legal proceedings which %

may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and
make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
Witness my hand this //£ day of
(Jl4L*[t

^,i /

UUft

, County of

Vha^^^t^r^
//

IftyhSAJs
MOtHER A

^O^/c^^ ,

, 1$£ 71 at
State of

^\oyuUn^^^

AKA>3

STATE OF V £<£'/!

)

COUNTY U&^tUi/A-iS

)

On the //> day of M ^ ^ C J ^ - I M
appeared before me, /^w^<££.t

/<!?^t^<»/>t/'fy

, 1 9 ^ 9, personally
» AKA \j-iu*i?t-~

Xyt^-**<*-*—*

the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she
executed the same.
My commission expires:
rv. C

A? 0/D

Residencei

A-n-^/

C^Jf

^<"^S

&/&•*(

may be held in courts of the State of Utah, or elsewhere, for the purpose of
determination of the release and the adoption of said child or any thereof.
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing release and
know of the contents thereof and sign the same as my own free act and deed and
make and execute the same without any threat or promise.
Witness
day
of
witness my
my hand
nanu this
u u s //£
/ n uci
y UL

/$~4'

• County ° f

- •

1*2^^^*^^
\V j<^7^^t^^.^

Q

u6><. .
'O^U-i

W^eY>

t

19£ 7 . at

, State of

^dAAon/^V^

AKA

STATE Of V £<£'/£
*Jj

COUNTY O E ^ / ^ U . - L ^

)
^

8S

)

On the //> day of \J ^^u*
appeared before me, 7^v~>^^i

r^t.**

, 1 9 ^ 9 , personally

/Q.<^>^*£.ru*>ts

. AKA O-rt^,/^ ) ' A o > t ^ ^ u /

the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that she
/}

executed the same.
My commission expires:

/Jstf-^i^ty^s

/<Y

^/^^A^-r

Residence:

-C-2\£"

r%^er
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-25

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
GJ.S. — 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 33 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions *=»
58(2).

78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
History: L- 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp„ 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996,
ch. 79, S 110.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,1996, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "An action may be
brought within" for "Within"; deleted "An ac-

tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3);
and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Antitrust Act actions,
§ 76-10-925.
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations,
§ 78-15-3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Assigned cause of action.
Breach of fiduciary duty.
Conflict of laws.
Damage of private property for public use.
Discovery rule.
Discovery rule.
Divorce actions.
Equitable actions.
Excessive freight charges.
Extension of period.
Federal civil rights actions.
Indemnity or guaranty bond.
Judgment lien.
Land contract
Malpractice.
Mortgages.
Negligent employment
Nuisances.
Open account
Oral contract
Oral modification of written contract.

Other claims for relief.
— Federal claim.
— Negligence.
— Promissory estoppel.
Paternity action.
Overpayment.
Personal injuries.
Pleading and proof.
Product liability.
Purpose of section.
Quieting title.
Recovery of payments under note.
Reformation of instrument
Relation back of complaints.
Relief not otherwise provided for.
Restraining actions.
Running of statute.
— Payment of settlement obligation.
Stockholder's duty to pay taxes.
Taking for public use.
Tax paid under protest
Tolling.
— Class actions.
Torts.
Trustees.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
violate the automatic stay provisions of the
federal bankruptcy code, because a renewal is
not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the
original judgment. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 R2d 795 (Utah 1990).
Stipulations.
Parties to contract may stipulate for period of
limitations shorter than thatfixedby statute of
limitations. Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284,184 P.
821 (1919).
Support or maintenance.
The eight-year statute of limitations applies
to past due unpaid installments for alimony or
support of minor children, and therefore execution may issue only for the arrearages accumulated within a period of eight years. Seeley v.
Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975).
A Utah action brought in 1978 to enforce a
1975 Ohio action for support arrearages, which
also included a 1967 Ohio action for support
arrearages, was timely filed under this section.
Logan v. Schneider, 609 P.2d 943 (Utah 1980).
Wife could apply her time-barred claim for
child support arrearages to offset her husband's
hen on the marital home, and then affirma-

78-12-23

tively assert her claim for past due support that
had accrued within the limitations period.
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Tolling.
In action by administrator, indebtedness created by check was held to be barred, and
statute was not tolled by unauthorized acts of
plaintiff. Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bankers, 75
Utah 149, 283 P. 1055 (1929).
Action to renew a judgment brought more
than eight years after the date of entry of the
original judgment was barred by this section
even though defendant had signed a written
agreement acknowledging the obligation and
had made some payments thereon less than
eight years before commencement of the action.
The common-law rule which tolled the limitation period in case of acknowledgment or part
payment is limited by § 78-12-44 so that it now
applies only to contract actions. Yergensen v.
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965).
Cited in Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jar. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 1073,1074; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 897 et seq.
C-J.S. - 27C C.J.S Divorce §§ 684 to 693; 50
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 854, 871; 67AC.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 73 to 89.
AXJL — Statute of limitations: effect of

delay in appointing administrator or other representative on cause of action accruing at or
after death of person in whose favor it would
have accrued, 28 A.L.R.3d 1141.
Key Numbers. — Divorce ^* 311; Judgment
«= 910,934; Parent and Child «=» 3.3(4), 3.4(2).

78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-23; L. 1984, ch. 16, § 2; 1996,
ch. 79, { 109; 1996, ch. 210, 8 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective April 29,1996, in the
introductory paragraph, substituted "An action
may be brought within* for "Within*; deleted
"An action" at the beginning of Subsections (1)
to (3); and in Subsections (1) and (2), substituted a semicolon for a period.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 210, effective

April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection (3)
regarding distribution of criminal proceeds to
victims.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3.
Promise to pay extends period, § 78-12-44.
Three-year limitation period for action on
written insurance contract, § 31A-21-313.
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Rule 4.1

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

participant in a proceeding before a ... legislative body... should never be participated i n . . .
by lawyers." DR 7-106(B)(l) provided that "[i]n
presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer

1156

shall disclose ... [ulnless privileged or irrelevant, the identity of the clients he represents
and of the persons who employed him.M

Transactions with Persons Other Than
Clients
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others.
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.
COMMENT
Misrepresentation
A lawyer is required to be truthful when
dealing with others on a client's behalf, but
generally has no affirmative duty to inform an
opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates
or affirms a statement of another person that
the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations
can also occur by failure to act.
Statements of Fact
This rule refers to statements of fact.
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions
in negotiation, certain types of statements or-

dinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on
the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim
are in this category, and so is the existence of
an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
Fraud by Client
Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive
law may require a lawyer to disclose certain
information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is,
however, subject to the obhgations created by
Rule 1.6.

CODE COMPARISON
Paragraph (a) is substantially similar to DR
7-102(A)(5), which stated that a[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ...
[klnowingly make a false statement of law or
fact"

With regard to paragraph (b), DR
7-102(A)(3) provided that a lawyer shall not
*[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that
which he is required by law to reveal."

Rule 4.2. Communication with Person Represented by
Counsel.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. This rule does not apply to communications with government parties unless litigation about the subject of the
representation is pending or imminent. Communications with elected officials
are permissible when litigation is pending or imminent after disclosure of the
representation to the official.
(Amended effective April 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment added the last two sentences.

COMMENT
This Rule does not prohibit communication
with a party, or an employee or agent of a
party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a
private party, or between two organizations,
does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of

the other regarding a separate matter. Also,
parties to a matter may communicate directly
with each other and a lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the
other party is permitted to do so. For purposes
of this rule, litigation with a government party
includes any adversarial judicial or administrative proceeding. The requirement of disclo-
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sure of the representation is satisfied by disclosing the identity of the client, the subject
matter of the representation, and the fact that
the lawyer is acting in a representative capacity.
In the case of an organization, including a
governmental organization when litigation is
pending or imminent, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf
of the organization, and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that

Rule 4.4

matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose
statement may constitute an admission on the
part of the organization. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the
matter by his or her own counsel, the consent
by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule
3.4(f).
This Rule also covers any person, whether or
not a party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter in
question.

CODE COMPARISON
This Rule is substantially identical to DR
7-104(A)(l).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Ez parte contact with former employees,
Under the federal district court's rules of
practice, this rule does not prohibit ex parte
contact with the former employees of an orga-

nizational party that is represented by counsel.
Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch Bank, 139
F.R.D. 412 CD. Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Public Service Electrie & Gas Co. v. Associated Electric & Gas
Insurance Services, Ltd.: An Expansive View

of Rule 4.2 and Ex Parte Contacts With Former Employees, 1991 Utah L. Rev. 647.

Rule 4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Person.
(a) During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer
shall not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to
obtain counsel.
(b) In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
COMMENT
An unrepresented person, particularly one
not experienced in dealing with legal matters,
might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in

loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the
law even when the lawyer represents a client

CODE COMPARISON
There was no direct counterpart to this Rule
in the Code. DR 7-104(A)(2) provided that a
lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a person who

is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel ..."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Shearson Lehman Bros. v. Wasatch
Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412 (D. Utah 1991).

Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons*
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person

